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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - -- ---JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a corporation: JELCO, INC.,
a corporation: and CENTRAL UTAH
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
a body corporate and politic,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
Case No. 16208

vs.
STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant-Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages arising from the negligent
construction of a fiberglass storage tank, fabricated by Appellant.
Respondents claim a right to recovery on theories of negligence
and breach of contract, including express warranty.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury in October and November,
1978.

Following the completion of the evidence, the trial court

ruled that Appellant Structo-Lite was negligent,as a matter of
la~

and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the

damages sustained by Respondents Jacobsen Construction Company,
Inc., Jelco, Inc., and the Central Utah Water Conservancy
Sponsored byAt
the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
the Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
Jistrict.
the
request
of Appellant
a byspecial
verdict
was
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I
submitted to the jury.

The response to the question of

negligence of the Appellant was directed by the court.

The

jury found that Appellant also breached its warranties to and
ita contract with Respondents.

The jury responded affirmatively

to the questions of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk by Jacobsen and the Conservancy District, and apportioned
fault among the parties as follows:

Appellant Structo-Lite

70%, Jacobsen 20%, and the Conservancy District 10%.

The

jury answered no to Appellant's claim that Third Party
Defendant Templeton, Linke and Associates was negligent.

The

jury assessed damages to Jacobsen in the sum of $370,987.11
and to the Conservancy District in the sum of $51,003.66.

In

keeping with the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, the trial judge
extended judgment in favor of Jacobsen and against Appellant
for the sum of $296,789.69, plus interest of $77,409.26, for a
total of $374,198.95 and in favor of the Conservancy District
and against Appellant for the sum of $45,903.29,plus interest of
$11,972.59, for a total of $57, 875.88.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On appeal Structo-Lite does not complain of the method
used by the trial court in allocating the damages among the
respective parties, but claims that no damages should have been
awarded in favor of Respondents because of the jurys' finding on
the issue of assumption of risk.
Respondents request this Court to affirm the lower court's
holding that pursuant to the Utah Comparative Negligence Act,
assumption
ofQuinney
theLawrisk
is no
longer
bar
to Services
recovery
Sponsored by the S.J.
Library. Funding
for digitization
provideda by complete
the Institute of Museum
and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in the State of Utah.

By way of cross appeal, Respondent•

also seek a determination by this Court that the trial court
erred in the following particulars:
(a)

In permitting Appellant to amend its Answer on the

morning of trial to assert the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk.
(b)

In refusing to find, as a matter of law, or to

direct a verdict that Respondents were not contributorily
negligent and that Respondents did not assume the risk.
(c)

In denying Respondents' Motion to Amend their Complaint

to raise as an additional ground for relief Appellant's willful
and reckless conduct.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein, Jacobsen Construction
Company, Inc. and Jelco, Inc. (hereinafter: "Jacobsen" or
Respondents"), as joint venturers, were the general contractors
for construction o£ the Jordan Water Treatment Plant located at
Bluffdale, Utah.

Plaintiff and Respondent Central utah Water

Conservancy District (hereinafter:

"the Conservancy District"

or "Respondent"), was and is the owner of the water treatment
plant. Defendant and Appellant herein, Structo-Lite Engineering,
Inc.

(hereinafter:

"Structo-Lite" or "Appellant"), was a

fiberglass products fabricator which, pursuant to a subcontract
with Jacobsen, supplied fiberglass products which it had
fabricated, including six fiberglass tanks, for installation in
the Jordan Water Treatment Plant.

Third-Party Defendant Templeton,

Linke and Associates were the project engineers and prepared the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plant.
In 1972 Jacobsen contracted with the Conservancy District
to build a water treatment plant at Bluffdale, Utah.

Plans

and specifications for the plant and all other construction
documents had been previous!¥ prepared by Templeton, Linke
and Associates.

The plans for the water treatment plant

contemplated the installation of six large fiberglass tanks,
approximately 12-1/2 feet in diameter and 24 feet high, on the
third floor of the building which housed the main water treatment
facilities.

It was intended that the tanks would be used for

storage of liquid alum, a chemical commonly used in the
purification of culinary water.

The building was designed to

permit the tanks to extend through circular openings in the fourth
and fifth floors.

Liquid alum was to be fed into the tanks

through a system of pipes extending to the fifth floor and
to be drained from the tanks by means of a gravity feed system
through pipes attached near the tank bases.

(Exh. 3-D-21).

Shortly after the contract was awarded, Mr. David Bevan,
president of Structo-Lite, telephoned Jacobsen and expressed a
desire to provide all fiberglass items and materials required by
the plans and specifications.

(Tr. 332, 333).

At the first meetir.:

between Bevan and Mr. Dick Berg, an agent for Jacobsen, Bevan
presented Berg with a business card which stated:

"Structo-

Lite Fiberglass Engineering, Inc., David Bevan, President."
(Tr. 13,335).

At this initial conference Bevan represented that

his company would be able to fabricate fiberglass tanks which
would meet the plans and specifications prepared by Templeton,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-sLinke and Associates.

He also outlined to Berg his

and previous experience, including construction of a number of
other tanks for major industries in the area, such as
Kennecott Copper Corporation and Solar Salt.

(Tr. 336).

Based upon Bevan's representations and verbal bid,
Jacobsen prepared and delivered to Structo-Lite a standard fora
purchase order to purchase all of the fiberglass items required
for the water treatment plant, including the six liquid alum
storage tanks.

(Tr. 337).

The purchase order provided

that Structo-Lite would supply the tanks and other items to
meet all plans and engineering specifications and that they
would be warranted by Structo-Lite as to quality of workmanship and materials.

(Exh. P-4).

Bevan read the purchase order,

including the provisions covering warranty of workmanship and
materials and compliance with ;the plans and specifications.
He then signed the purchase order and returned a copy to
Jacobsen.

(Tr. 24-26).

As required by the purchase order, Mr. Bevan prepared on
behalf of Structo-Lite several letters for submission to
Jacobsen which described the fiberglass materials and in
particular the liquid alum storage tanks Structo-Lite would
build.

In these letters Bevan again represented that all

materials furnished would be "suitable and proper" for the
purposes and uses intended

(Exh. P-8, P-10, P-11) and warranted

the quality of the materials and workmanship of the fiberglass
products he had agreed to supply.

As a matter of course, the

letters were forwarded by Jacobsen to Templeton, Linke and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and Technology
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shop drawings prepared showing the construction of the liquid
alum storage tanks.

The drawings were delivered to Jacobsen

and then forwarded to Templeton, Linke and Associates.

(Tr.340),

(Thecontract between Jacobsen and the Conservancy District
provided that Jacobsen had no responsibility for review of
or authority to approve shop drawings or other representations
of suppliers, manufacturers or subcontractors such as "suitable
and proper" statements.

This responsibility and authority

rested solely and exclusively with Templeton, Linke and
Associates.)

(Exh. 3-D-22).

In June, 1973, Structo-Lite delivered to the project

the

first four tanks it had manufactured.

The remaining two tanks

were delivered the following November.

(Tr.665,668).

Prior to

delivery of any tanks, Mr. Harvey Wright, the project superintendent for Jacobsen, visited the Structo-Lite shop.

Wright

noticed that the tanks appeared to be slightly out-of-round.
He conveyed this information to Mr. Hutchinson, the representative
for the Conservancy District,and then verified that the areas in
the water treatment building where the tanks were to be located
had sufficient tolerance to permit the tanks to protrude through t!·
holes in the floors.
Structo-Lite shop.

(Tr. 662,663).

Hutchinson also visited the

Thereafter, he contacted American Testing

Laboratories and requested that they visit Structo-Lite as
part of the normal inspection of suppliers and manufacturers
who were providing materials for the water treatment plant.
(Tr.471,472).

Hutchinson received reports from American Testin~

Laboratories
describing
their
inspection
of ofStructo-Lite's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by the Institute
Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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facilitites and fabricating processes.

(Tr. 473).

Mr. Berg

also visited the Structo-Lite shop to determine when the tanka
would be delivered.

However, he made no inspection of the tanka

or evaluation of their quality and was not qualified to do so.
(Tr.348)
When the tanks arrived at the job site,

Harvey Wright

observed that some of the temporary supports used to maintain
roundness had failed in transit, causing the tanks to appear
somewhat elliptical at the open end and resulting in damage
to the flanges located at the tops of the tanks.

He and Harvey

Hutchinson discussed the need for repairs to the top flanges
and the fact that some of the tanks were missing outlets and
tie-down brackets.

(Tr. 667).

Mr. Bevan was contacted.

He

indicated that he would come to the job site to make the
necessary repairs and install the remaining connections. (Tr. 668).
Mr. Steve Jacobsen visited the Structo-Lite facilities after
the first four tanks had been delivered to expedite delivery
by Structo-Lite of the remaining two tanks.

Having no experience

in the manufacture of fiberglass tanks, no effort was made by
him to determine the quality of the work being done by StructoLite.

(Tr. 624,642).
The following spring (1974) and prior to the completion of

the job, all of the tanks were tested for leaks.

Testing was

accomplished by filling the tanks with water and observing if
there were any leaks.

(Tr. 485).

Four of the six tanks had

:cn",or water leaks, however, the tank that subsequently failed
jld

:t

not.

(Tr.ll9).

structo-Lite was contacted about

the leaks.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Services
and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah
State Library.
sent a crew toLibrary
the
job
site to
Make the
necessary
repairs.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

Thereafter the tanks were determined to be water-tight.

(Tr.486).

Just prior to placing the plant into operation, a seven-day
test of the plant facilities was conducted.

The plant passed

the test and was pronounced ready for operation and treatment
of water commenced about the end of May 1974.

Liquid- alum

was first delivered to the plant May 28, 1974 (Tr. 230) and was
put in one of the tanks and used from that tank.

On July 12, 1974,

the Conservancy District began to fill the tank designated as the
south center tank with liquid alum.

By July 15, this tank was

filled to a depth of 20 feet 6 inches.

(Tr. 232,234).

On

July 16, while making his daily rounds, Mr. Richard Nelson,
the plant operator, noticed liquid alum leaking from a small
hairline sized opening near the south side of the south center
tank.

As he observed the leak, a second leak erupted.

Becoming

concerned, Nelson determined to lessen the pressure in the tank.
He left the area and had just reached the floor immediately
below the level of the tank when it erupted, spreading alum
throughout the entire building.

(Tr. 237,238).

Even though cleanup of the alum and repair work was begun
immediately, the flooding of the building with liquid alum
resulted in substantial damage to the heating and electrical
systems in the plant.

It was 13 days before the plant was made

operational again, but it was almost a year before removal of
the alum from the building was deemed completed.

(Tr.240).

However, there is still evidence of alum and corrosion in
various portions of the building.

(Tr.532).

This action was brought by Jacobsen and the Conservancy

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Structo-Lite
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result of the tank failure.

Structo-Lite brouqht a third-party

complaint against Templeton, Linke and Associates claiminq that
the building design and tank specifications were inadequate,
thereby causing or contributing to the damaqes incurred.
At the conclusion of the evidence a special verdict was
submitted to the jury.

The court directed a verdict with respect

to the negligence of Structo-Lite, having determined from the
eveidence that as a matter of law, Structo-Lite was neqliqent and
such negligence was a proximate cause of the damages.

In its

answers to the special verdict, the jury found that Jacobsen
and the Conservancy District were contributorily negligent and
assumed the risk of injury to the extent 20\ and 10\
respectively.

With respect to the claim of Structo-Lite Engineering

against Templeton, Linke and Associates, the jury found that
Templeton, Linke and Associates was not negligent.
Based upon the jury's answers to the special verdict,
the trial court entered judgment on behalf of Jacobsen and the
Conservancy District, computing the amount of the damages by
applying the provisions of the Utah Comparative Negligence
Statute to thedamageamount determined by the jury.

Structo-

Lite has appealed on the theory that because Jacobsen and the
Conservancy District were found to have assumed the risk, they
are completely barred from recovery.
Jacobsen and the Conservancy District have cross-appealed
on three issues:
1.

The trial court erred in permitting Structo-Lite to

raise at the trial the issues of contributory negligence and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
assu~ption of the risk; Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

2. · The trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion
of Jacobsen and the Conservancy District for a directed verdict
on all of their claims and in refusing to grant a directed verdict
in their favor with respect to Structo-Lite's defenses of

contributory negligence and assumption of the risk: and
3.

The trial court erred in denying the motion of

Jacobsen and the Conservancy District to amend their complaint
after completion of the testimony to assert as an additional
ground for relief against Structo-Lite the willful and reckless
conduct of Structo-Lite.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I. UNDER THE UTAH COMPARATIVE NBGLIGENCB S'l'A'l'UTB, 'l'BB
DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMPTION OF RISK" NO LONGER CONSTITtJ'l'BS A BAR
TO RECOVERY.
In adopting the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, Utah Code
Annotated, §78-27-37 (1953, as amended), the Legislature swept
aside the common law doctrine theretofore followed by the Utah
courts to the effect that a plaintiff who claimed injury due to
the negligence of another was barred from recovery if he was in
the least wise contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk
of injury.

The new law adopted in 1973 provides:

Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages
for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in
injury to person or property if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used
in this act, "Contributory negligence" includes "assumption
of the risk."
The statutory language is straightforward.

The first phrase

indicates that contributory negligence is no longer a complete
bar to recovery in an action based on negligence.

The last

sentence makes clear that for purposes of the act, "assumption
of the risk" is now to be treated in the same manner as
contributory negligence; namely, it shall no longer be a complete
bar to recovery.

No other reading or interpretation of the statute

is or can be justified, the lengthy and convuluted argument in
Appellant's Brief notwithstanding.
This court has already had an opportunity to interpret the
Utah Comparative

·

Negl~gence

Statute as it applies to the doctrine

· k" ;n
the case of Rigtrup
~
_
_ v. Strawberry
In that
by theAssociation,
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
digitization
provided(Utah,
by the Institute1977)
of Museum· and Library Services
WaterSponsored
Users
563 forP.2d
1247

of "assumption o f t he

r~s
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action the defendant raised the defense of assumption of the risk
as well as the defense of contributory negligence.

In answer to'\

special interrogatories, the jury found the plaintiff to be 90%
negligent and the defendant to be 10% negligent.

Pursuant to

this verdict, the trial court entered judgment for the defendant,
ostensibly under the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute.

on

appeal the plaintiff claimed that the trial judge erred when he
instructed the jury as to the defense of "assumption of the risk,'
having already instructed the jury on the issue of contributocy
negligence.

The opinion of this Court discusses the general

interrelationship of the two defenses:
It [assumption of the risk] has sometimes been said to be
but a specialized aspect of contributory negligence in that
it can be intermingled and fused with other aspects thereof
in certain circumstances.
It is also sometimes said to be
something separate from contributory negligence as it
undoubtedly can be in some circumstances.
Id. at 1250.
But this Court then went on to hold that the doctrine of assumptic
of the risk clearly falls within the ambit of the Utah ComparativE
Negligence Statute:
Where there is a known danger, the risk of which is voluntan.
assumed by a party, such action may well fall within the lac.\
of due care which constitutes negligence and also may be
correctly termed an assumption of risk.
If such be the . . .
situation, the party should be charged with the respons~blll:
for his conduct, by whatever term it may be called; and the.
comparative negligence statute quoted above should be a~pl~
as the trial court correctly did in this case.
(Emphas~s
added)
Id. at 1250.
Appellant expends a great many pages of its Brief arguing that the
doctrines of "assumption of the risk" and "contributory negligence
are distinct and separate defenses.
with Appellant on that point.

Respondents have no quarrel

Respondents merely point out tha:
l

.

q

regardless
whether
the fordefenses
are
separate
orLibrary
over
appLn .•
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the Legislature has mooted the issue as to whether either is a
complete bar to recovery by a claimant.

By statute, they are now

to be treated in the same manner when raised in defense to a
claim of negligence.

Appellant states in its Brief that

"assumption of the risk" and "contributory negligence• have long
been recognized in this jurisdiction as distinctly separate
defenses.

(Defendant's Brief at 6)

Respondents submit, however,

that the Legislature added the last sentence to the statute--•As
used in this act 'contributory negligence' includes 'assumption
of the risk'"--precisely to make it quite clear that for purposes
of comparing the conduct of the respective parties, there is no
longer a viable distinction.

Moreover, this Court explicitly held

in the Rigtrup case that, indeed, this was the intent of the
Legislature in enacting the new law:
That our conclusion just stated is the correct one under our
law is supported not only by the reasoning just stated and
the cases cited, but is made abundantly clear by the fact
that the legislature, apparently in order to avoid any
misunderstanding thereon, appended the last sentence as
quoted above that: As used in this act, "contributory
negligence" includes "assumption of the risk." That
sentence indicates a clear legislative intent to recognize
the doctrine of "assumption of risk" as an aspect of
contributory negligence in Utah law. (Emphasis added) Id.
at 1250.
In light of the above judicial pronouncement, Respondents
are frankly mystified by Appellant's temerity in baldly

asserting

that to read the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute as equating
assumption of the risk with contributory negligence is "a
conclusion not substantiated in the case law of this jurisdiction"
(Appellant's Brief at 6), particularly in view of the fact that
case in its own Brief~
· 1y from the R1.'gtruo
Appellant cites ex t ens1.ve
_
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In an effort to find support for its position, Appellant has
referred to the case of Becker v. Beaverton School District No.

!!•

551 P.2d 498 (Ore. App., 1976), a decision by the intermediate

appellate court of Oregon.

As is evident from a reading of the

opinion, the case stands alone.

Prior to the decision of the

appellate court but after the trial, the Oregon legislature
amended the Oregon Comparative Negligence Statute so that the
decision in the case would have no effect on any other factual
situation.
In Becker the plaintiff was an elementary school student who
was injured on a piece of playground equipment, a climbing
structure made of wooden timbers.
the center.
the hole.

The structure had a hole in

Playground rules forbade students from jumping across
Plaintiff was injured when, in contravention of the

rules, he attempted to leap across the opening.

As an affirmative

defense to plaintiff's action, the defendant school district
alleged specific facts by which it claimed that the plaintiff had
assumed the risk of injury.

The court termed the defendant's

allegations as pleading assumption of the risk in its "primary
sense."

In this connection, the Oregon court discussed at some

length the development of Oregon law with respect to "assumption
of the risk" and concluded that Oregon recognizes a "primary"
sense (no duty on the part of the defendant to protect plaintiff
from a risk) and a "secondary" sense (a phase of contributory
negligence) of "assumption of the risk."

This material dichotor:

is blissfully ignored by Appellant in its efforts to equate the
Oregon result to Utah law.

1

I

Appellant also ignores the empha 515
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placed by the Oregon court on the fact that the defendant in
Becker had pleaded with specificity what the court termed to be
the defense in its primary sense.

At no point in the case at

bar has Appellant ever done more than claim generally that
Respondents "assumed the risk."

Appellant has made no effort

to plead specifically the facts which it claims establish such
a defense, nor has Appellant even bothered to set forth in its
Brief whether the evidence at the trial indicated assumption of
the risk in its "primary" or "secondary" sense--the key issue on
which the Oregon court's decision turns.

Instead, Appellant

merely argues that if it pleads "assumption of the risk• and the
jury so finds, it avoids the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute-a position which is not even supported by the unique decision of
the Oregon Appellate Court.
In a further effort to cloud and obscure the clear meaning
of the Utah law, Appellant claims a similarity between the Utah
and Oregon statutes, then speculates that the Oregon Legislature
must have recognized that the Oregon Comparative Negligence
Statute passed in 1973 did not eliminate assumption of the risk
as a complete bar because in 1975 it amended the act to provide
in part that:
The doctrine of implied assumption of the risk is abolished.
(Emphasis added) ORS 18.475/0regon Laws 1975, Chapter 599,
§5.

Appellant's speculation is unfounded, as reference to the
legislative history of the 1975 amendment establishes. A memorandum
to the Oregon House Jud1.c1·ary Committee covering the 1975 amendments
abolishing implied assumption
re:erring to the propose d Statute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Section 5 abolishes the doctrine of implied assumption of
9
the risk.
Ritter v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504 (1961) subsumed
under contributory negligence the form of assumption of the
risk in which plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably
.
encounters a known risk~ this type of assumption of the risk 'I
is unaffected by. Section 5 and should be plead as contributor;
negligence. Pla1ntiff's reasonable assumption of the risk ·1
is unaffected by Section 5 and should be plead as contributor.
negligence. Plaintiff's reasonable assumpti~ij of the risk ·
or "implied consent" is no longer a defense.
This resolves!
the anomaly arguably possible under present law that
i
plaintiff's reasonable conduct might bar recovery completely '
while unreasonable conduct leads to the possibility of
partial recovery.
(Emphasis added) Appendix G, House
Judiciary Committee Memorandum, 5/25/75, at 2.
-----

I

From the above statement, it is clear that the Oregon
Legislature presumed, unlike both Appellant herein and the court
in Becker, that "assumption of the risk" was already included
under the Oregon Comparative Negligence Act.

The 1975 amendment

was designed only to guard against what the legislature saw as a
possibility that the statute could be misconstrued--precisely as
Appellant has done in its Brief herein.

The Utah Comparative

Negligence Act is clearly written and easily interpreted.

This

Court has already held in Rigtrup, supra, that assumption of the
risk is included within the purview of that Act.

Appellant's

efforts to confuse and obfuscate the obvious meaning of the
statute

and

the clear intention of the Utah Legislature should

be rejected by this Court.

9The courts of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washi~gton, and California
have abolished implied assumption of the r~sk as an independent
doctrine.
Connecticut has accomplished the same result by statu~
Conn. Pub. Act. No. 73-622, Sec. ic.
lOaf course if defendant has no duty toward the Plaintiff there
is no liability.
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POINT II. "ASSUMPTION OF RISK" IS NOT A VALID DBPBIISB '1'0
RESPONDENTS' CLAIM BASED UPON BREACH OF EXPRESS ~
AND CAN NEITHER BAR SUCH A CLAIM NOR ACT TO REDUCE RBSPO~I'
RIGHT OF RECOVERY.
Respondents' Complaint

raise~

in addition to a claim of

negligence, causes of action for the failure of Appellant to
deliver tanks which conformed to the express written warranties
it had provided to Respondents.

As is correctly stated by

Appellant in its Brief, under Utah Code Annot., S70A-2-313 (1953,
as amended), an action brought upon a contract claiming failure
to provide a product which complied with the contract specifications
is an action for breach of express warranty.
law governing express warranty applies.

In such cases the

Appellant, however, has

incorrectly stated in its Brief what that law is.
In support of its claim that assumption of risk remains a
bar to a breach of warranty action, Appellant quotes from two
secondary authorities:

White and Summers, Uniform Commercial

Code (1972 Ed.), and Restatement of Torts 2d, §402A.

Neither

quotation cited by Appellant has anything to do with claims which
are based on a breach of express warranty.

The statement from

White and Summers deals with defenses in breach of implied
warranty cases as a careful reading of the remainder of that
chapter and the chapter on express warranties makes clear.

The

quotation from the Restatement of Torts 2d comes from the section
concerning "strict liability," a point of law not even in issue
in the case at bar.
As to the question of whether assumption of the risk can be
asserted against a claim based on breach of express warranty,
le fortodigitization
locate
decision
by Library
this
Court.
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However, Respondents direct the Court's attention to a decision
of the Kansas Supreme Court, Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring,
214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974), wherein that court examined
carefully the Kansas statute on express warranties which is
identical to its Utah counterpart.

In that case the plaintiffs

were buyers of infected cattle which had been expressly warranted
by the sellers to be free from disease.

Finding that the lower

court erred in failing to instruct on express warranty, the Kansas

I

court succinctly stated:

Contributory negligence and assumption of risk cannot be
asserted against the buyers, and the buyers are not obligateC
to show particular reliance upon the express warranties,
since they are contractual. All the buyers are required to
establish is that the express warranties were made and that
they were false, thereby establishing a breach of the
contract.
Id. at 293.
In the instant action there is no doubt that Respondents
established at trial Appellant's express warranties and Appellant'
breach thereof.
appeal.
is clear.

Appellant does not even contest that issue on

The import of the above statement from the Kansas court
Not only are Appellant's claims of contributory

negligence and assumption of the risk of no avail against
Respondents' claims for breach of contract and express warranty,
such claims cannot act to reduce Respondents' damages, as is
otherwise permitted in an action based on negligence.

The jury

having found that Appellant breached its contract and express
warranties, Respondents are entitled to the full amount of the
damages which were awarded.

This Court should direct the trial

judge to enter an order accordingly.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING APPBLLABT
TO RAISE THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTIQa
OF THE RISK AT THE TRIAL.
When this action was initially filed by Jacobsen and the
Conservancy District, Structo-Lite filed an Answer dated

De~r

20, 1974, in which it alleged as separate defenses:
(a) "The rupture of the
Plaintiffs complain were
by the negligence of the
greater than Defendant's
(b)

tank and the damage of which
proximately caused or solely caused
Plaintiffs which was equal to or ·
negligence, if any:• and

"Plaintiffs assumed the risk of loss."

(Answer, Third Defense and Sixth Defense)
Thereafter Structo-Lite filed an Amended Answer dated August
27, 1976, in which it asserted merely that "Any recovery awarded
the Plaintiffs should be reduced in the proportion of their own
contributory negligence."

(Amended Answer, paragraph 7)

The

Amended Answer did not contain the third and sixth defenses raised
in the original Answer, nor did it provide that such defenses
were to be considered a part of or incorporated into the Amended
Answer.
It was not until the morning of the trial that Respondents
became aware Structo-Lite still asserted or sought to assert the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk raised
in the original Answer.
At that time and over the objection of Respondents, the
court permitted Structo-Lite to assert the additional defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk which had been
deleted from Appellant's Amended Answer.

(Tr. 46, 47)

In

gr 3 nting Structo-Lite's Motion to Amend its Amended Answer on
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trial court committed prejudicial error which should be rectified

by this Court on appeal.
The law with respect to the effect of an amended pleading
is clear.

Whenever a pleading is amended by a pleading which

makes no reference to the original pleading, the result is to
treat the original pleading as having no further validity.

The

rule has been stated thusly:
An amended pleading that is complete in itself and makes no

reference to nor adopts any portion of a prior pleading
supersedes the latter. • • • The superseded pleading cannot
be utilized to aid a defective amended pleading. 3 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, Sl5.08(7) (2d Ed., 1978)
This basic principle of procedure has been recognized as
valid and previously adopted by this Court in Teamsters, Chauffers,
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 2 2 2 v. Motor Cargo, 5 30 P. 2c
807 (Utah, 1974).

This Court held that:

The law is overwhelming to the effect that when an amended
complaint, complete in and of itself, is filed, the former
complaint is functus officio and cannot be used for any
purpose. Id. at 808.
The rule has been applied in other jurisdictions to amended
answers, as well as amended complaints.

Proctor

&

Gamble Defense

Corp. v. Bean, 146 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir., 1945); Meyer v. State
Board of Equalization, 267 P.2d 257, 262 (Cal., 1954); Gregio v.
Roybal, 442 P.2d 585, 587 (N.M., 1968); Jenkins v. Donaldson,
429 P.2d 841, 845 (Ida., 1967).
It is evident that when Appellant amended its Answer and die
not refer therein to its earlier pleading, the original Answer
was no longer to be considered as having any validity or effect.
It was as though it ceased to be a part of the record·
Chauffers,

l~arehousemen

Teamste:'

and Helpers, Local Union 222 v · llotor
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The effect of such failure of Structo-Lite to allege iD it.
Amended Answer the affirmative defenses of contributory aegli..-ce
and assumption of the risk is to require a finding that StruatoLite waived those defenses.

Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc.,

requires a party to plead such defenses affirmatively in a
responsive pleading such as an answer:
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively • • • assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
• • • and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense.
(Emphasis added)
The failure to raise an affirmative defense in a responsive
pleading has been held by this Court to be a waiver of the right
to raise the defense.

Pratt v. Board of Education of the Uintah

County School District, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah, 1977): Bezner
v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah, 1976);
General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,
545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah, 1976); Wasescha v. Terra, Inc., 528 P.2d
802, 803 (Utah, 1974).

See:

Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.
While this Court has also stated that Rule 15(b) of Utah
Rules of Civ. Proc. may operate as an exception to the waiver
provision (General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero
Dynasty Corporation, supra; Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205,
381 P.2d 86 (1963)), the facts in this case do not justify the
granting of the amendment.
In Cheney this Court stressed that the plaintiff failed to
~ake any representation to the trial court that he was or would

be prejudiced or disadvantaged as a result of the evidence
submitted

by

the defendant in support of an affirmative defense
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wbich had not been raised in defendant's pleadings.

Noting that

Rule 54(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires every final
judgaent to grant the relief to which a party is entitled, even
if no auch relief is requested in the pleadings, this Court
agreed that if the plaintiff was not prejudiced, conforming the
pleadings to the evidence was proper.
In General Insurance Company of America, supra, there was
evidence adduced at the trial that there was a lack of consideration and therefore no contract as between the plaintiff and two
of the defendants named Butcher.

After such evidence was

received without objection, Butchers moved to amend their answer
under Rule lS(b) to conform to the evidence.
denied by the trial judge.

This motion was

In reversing the action of the lower

court, this Court explained that Rule lS(b) has two separate
parts:
The first part provides that if issues are tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.

* * *
The first part of Rule 15(b) should be contrasted with the
second part where an amendment is offered during trial in
response to an objection to evidence, In such a case, the
standards set forth in the second part of Rule 15(b) will
apply, viz., leave may be granted in the absence of prejudi~
undue delay, or laches.
Id. at 505-506.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Crockett agreed that
amendments under Rule 15 (b) are subject to the court's discretic
which should be exercised liberally in the interests of JUstice.
But he cautioned that such amendments sf-)ould onl~· be per:-rut::cd:
. . in such circ~mstances and upon such condi::~ons as
will not place the adverse party at an undue disadvantage
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Respondents respectfully submit that the trial judge abused his
discretion when he permitted the Appellant Structo-Lite to amend
its Amended Answer on the morning of the first day of trial to
include defenses which Respondents had every reason to believe
had been discarded by Appellant more than two years previous to
that date.
Appellant's Motion to Amend was protested vigorously by
Respondents, who pointed out that had they been aware Appellant
intended to raise the deleted defenses, they would have altered
their entire strategy in preparing their case and in aligning
the parties.

(Tr. 46, 47)

Clearly, the trial judge's action

in granting Appellant's Motion goes far beyond the standard of
"undue disadvantage" and "unfairness" espoused by Justice Crockett.
The trial court's action becomes even more prejudicial to
Respondents in light of the tactics used by Appellant during and
after the trial and on appeal concerning Appellant's defense that
Respondents assumed the risk of injury.

When the trial court

granted Appellant's Motion to add to its Amended Answer the two
previously deleted defenses, Respondents were given to understand
that the court permitted both defenses to be raised only because
the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute, Utah Code Annot.,
§78-27-37, 1953, as amended, provided for similar treatment with
respect to the defense of contributory negligence and the defense
of assumption of the risk.
At no time during the trial or afterwards when Appellant
submitted its proposed instructions to the jury did Appellant
~ssert that it was claiming the doctrine of assumption of the
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~i~

to be anything other than a defense associated with

ODDtributory negligence and subject to the provisions of the
Utah Cosparative Negligence Statute.
p~po•ed

In fact, Appellant's

special verdict form, which the court adopted and sub-

.ttted to the jury, instructed the jury "to apportion by
percentage the proximate contribution, if any, of each party
toward the loss.

w••

(Special Verdict, Question VIII)"

No effort

made or attempted in that question to distinguish between

contribution toward the loss resulting from negligence and
contribution toward the loss resulting from assumption of the
risk.

On the contrary, the jury was free to combine the conduct

of the Respondents with that of the Appellant in apportioning
the percentage of "proximate contribution" of each party to the
total damage sustained.
Appellant never claimed until after the jury's verdict was
entered that it intended the defense of assumption of the risk
to be a complete bar to Respondents' right of recovery.
Appellant's actions in this case constitute an effort on its
part to have its pleadings conformed to fit its version of the
jury's verdict.

Appellant has attempted in its Brief to justify

this position by claiming that it would have violated the rule
of McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah, 1974),
had its jury instructions

apprised

"the jury of the effect of

the finding that plaintiff [Respondents] had assumed the risk
of damage."

(Appellant's Brief at 19)

Respondents note, howeve!

that Appellant is quick to argue in Point I of its Brief that
this Court must hold assumption of the risk to be a complete bac
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to recovery because this

Cour~

in affirming Rigtrup v. Strawberry

Water Users Association, supra, ostensibly validated jury
instructions which say exactly what Appellant claims to be
reversible error.

(Appellant's Brief at 14, 15)

It would be extremely prejudicial and unjust to Respondents
for this Court to condone the methods employed by Appellant by
holding both that the trial court properly permitted Appellant
to amend its pleadings and that the jury's determination of
Respondents' assumption of the risk constitutes a complete bar
to recovery.

Appellant should be estopped by its silence

throughout the entire trial and pretrial proceedings from now
claiming Respondents are barred from recovery by assumption of
the risk.
In any event, Respondents are entitled to a finding that
the trial court abused its discretion in granting Appellant's
Motion to Amend and a holding that Appellant waived the defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk when it
deleted them from its Amended Answer.
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POIR'l' IV.

T

TBB EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED

TO A FINDING THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THEY DID NOT ASSUME
'lBB RISK OF INJURY.
At trial Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case
in support of ita claim that Respondents assumed the risk of
injury.

A' a result, Respondents were entitled, as a matter of

law, to an instruction that they did not assume the risk of any
injury from Appellant's conduct, which the trial court refused
to give.
As submitted to the jury, the doctrine of assumption of risk
was stated:
There is a legal principle commonly referred to by the term
"assumption of risk" which is as follows:
A company is said to assume risk when it voluntarily manifests
its assent to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous
condition and voluntarily exposes itself to that danger or
when it knows that a danger exists in either the condition,
use or operation of property and voluntarily accepts the
dangerous condition and uses the dangerous product.
Analysis of this statement reveals that before a party can
be found to have "assumed the risk," there must be evidence to
support the following findings:
(a)

Voluntary assent, manifested in some manner, to the

creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition; and
(b)

Voluntary exposure to the danger; or

(c)

Knowledge that the danger exists in the condition, use

or operation of property; and
(d)

Voluntary acceptance of the danger and use of the

dangerous product.
Evident from this analysis is the proposition that a partv
must know and appreciate what the danger is and ~hat the poss1t-'
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consequences may be before he can "assume the risk• of injury.
Anything short of that cannot constitute a basis for voluntary
action.

It is also obvious that a party cannot be held account-

able under the doctrine of assumption of the risk for latent
defects or dangers, the existence of which the party has no
knowledge, no matter how apparent they may be after an injury
has occurred.

Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075, 1076

(1952).
With these principles as a background, it is clear from a
review of the evidence presented at trial that Appellant failed
to establish any basis for the defense, much less carry the
burden of proof required.

Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins,

18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966): Peterson v. Nielsen, 9 Utah
2d 302, 343 P.2d 731 (1959).
Appellant made a great deal of noise at trial that Respondents
knew the tanks had "a lot of defects," "many irregularities," "a
lot of leaks," and that Respondents knew the tanks had been
negligently manufactured and Defendant hadn't tested them.
1181-82)

(Tr.

While the evidence does show that Respondents knew the

tanks leaked when they were water tested, the remainder of
Appellant's allegations are completely without foundation.
Harvey Wright testified that while visiting the Structo-Lite
shop, he observed two tanks standing in the yard in a vertical
oosition, half of a third tank partially assembled in the yard
and a quarter section on the mold in the shop.

Upon examination

of the completed tanks and the quarter section on the mold, he
noticed that they were out-of-round.

(Tr. 660, 661)

Mr. Wright
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414

DO~

measure the completed tanks but determined by visual

iaepection only that there appeared to be a difference of three
~

four inches in tank diameter from the high to low spot on the

tank.

(Tr. 662)

Bu~chin•on,

Mr. Wright conveyed his observations to Harvey

the representative for the Conservancy District.

Be further testified that his only concern about the out-of-

roundness of the tanks was whether the tanks would fit within
the tolerances provided in the areas where the tanks would be
located.

(Tr. 663, 689)

When the first four tanks were delivered to the job site,
some of the 2 X 4 supports used for bracing had apparently failed
in transit, causing the tanks to appear somewhat elliptical at
one end.

(Tr. 666)

The failure of the 2 X 4 braces in transit

had caused some damage to the flanges located at the top end of
the tanks.

Mr. Wright observed no damage to the interior of the

tanks or to the middle or lower end of the tanks.
692)

(Tr. 665, 666,

No evidence was presented that the out-of-roundness or

damage to the top flange of the tanks observed by Mr. Wright
caused him to believe or conclude that the tanks would or could
fail if filled with liquid alum, nor was any evidence presented
to the court to establish that the tank erupted either due to
its out-or-roundness or to the damaged top flange, both of which
had been repaired.

On the contrary, the testimony indicated

that the flange at the top of the tank was there for the sole
purpose of providing a means for bolting the lid to the tank
not for the purpose of adding strength to it.
was no pressure aoainst the tank lid.

Mo~eover,

there

(Tr. 105, 112, 113)
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After the tanks were installed, they were cleaned and
inspected by Structo-Lite.
observed.

No physical damage to the tanks vas

Mr. Bevan, the president of Structo-Lite, testified

that after installation, the tanks were still as firm and secure
as they had been when they left the Structo-Lite shop.

(Tr. 116)

It is clear from the foregoing that the observations of Mr.
Wright certainly did not impart to Jacobsen information sufficient
for a finding that Jacobsen was charged with knowledge of the
existence of a dangerous condition which had been created in the
layup and fabrication.

There is no evidence that any other

representative of Jacobsen noticed anything unusual with respect
to the tanks.
Mr. Harvey Hutchinson, engineer for the Conservancy District
at the project, testified that he observed the tanks being
constructed at Structo-Lite and noticed that a hand layup method
of fabrication was being used.

Mr. Hutchinson observed that the

tanks did not all have a smooth surface and places where apparently
the woven roving was not covered by the fiberglass matting.
551, 553)

(Tr.

Mr. Hutchinson saw flat spots and irregularities on

the tanks after they were set in the building.

(Tr. 562)

He

testified that this caused him to be concerned about what would
happen to the tanks during an earthquake.

He was not concerned,

however, that the irregularities and flat spots would cause the
tanks to fail if filled with liquid alum.

(Tr. 563)

Mr.

Hutchinson was the only representative of the Conservancy District
who testified at the trial concerning his observations of the
fiberglass tanks.

Again, no evidence was adduced to establish
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that the observations of Mr. Hutchinson put the Conservancy
Diatrict on notice that the tanks were in danger of failing if
filled with liquid alum.
Moreover, no evidence was presented that the irregularities
and unevenness in the surface of the fiberglass were the cause
of the tank's failure.

In fact, Mr. Glen Enke, an expert produced

by the Appellant, testified that the unevenness in the tank
surface would
spots.

~

have caused increased stress

at the thin

(Tr. 1092)

Mr. Hutchinson also testified that at his direction American
Testing Laboratories made several inspections of the Structo-Lite
facilities during the time the fiberglass tanks were being
fabricated.

(Tr. 472, 473)

The first report from American

Testing described the manner of hand layup and stated the tanks
had the "three-eighth inch minimum wall thickness as quoted by
Mr. Bevan."

(Tr. 476)

This report gave Mr. Hutchinson no

concern because the minimum wall thickness described in the
report was more than twice as thick as that called for in the
specifications.

(Tr. 476, 477)

The second report from American

Testing Laboratories reviewed the system for joining quarter
sections.

This also caused no concern to Mr. Hutchinson.

(Tr.

477, 478)

The third report from American Testing Laboratories

indicated that Structo-Lite was stripping a layer of glass that
did not set so that the deficient area could be reglassed.

The

report implied to Mr. Hutchinson that Structo-Lite was taking
care of deficiencies as they proceeded

~ith

fabrication of the

(Tr.
478,
479)Funding
~ofor digitization
other provided
evidence
or
testimon~
with
tanks.
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respect to the reports from American Testinq Laboratories was
presented.

The reports clearly did not cause the Conservancy

District to determine that a possibility of failure of the alum
tanks existed.
The only remaininq "defect" which Appellant claims could
have imparted knowledge to Jacobsen and the Conservancy District
was the leaks in the tanks which appeared when the tanks were
filled with water.
At trial Richard Nelson, Erik Thomsen, Harvey Hutchinson,
Stephen Jacobsen and Harvey Wright all testified to have either
participated in the water tests conducted on the fiberqlass tanks
or to have observed leaks in the tanks durinq the water testinq
(Tr. 225, 441, 442, 484, 485, 626, 673, 674)

procedure.

No

witness testified, however, and no other evidence was submitted
to the trial court which indicated that anyone became concerned
that the tanks could fail if filled with liquid alum as a result
of the water testing and leaks.

1-tr. Hutchinson made it very

plain that the purpose of filling the tanks with water was not
to determine whether the tanks would withstand specified tensile
pressures but whether the tanks had any leaks.

The water test

was a standard test done to all structures and reservoirs in the
plant.

(Tr. 485)

After the leaks were discovered, Structo-Lite was informed.
Structo-Lite then sent a crew to the plant to make the necessary
repairs.

(Tr. 121, 122, 486)

The leaks were repaired and the

tanks retested, at which time it was determined that they were
\·:ater tight.

(Tr. 486)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-32-

10 evidence was presented that the existence of the leaks

la

anr

tank.

way caused or contributed to the rupture of the fiberglass
In fact, Mr. David Bevan, president of Structo-Lite,

teatified that the tank which failed had never leaked (Tr. 119);

and Mr. Glen Bnke, Appellant's expert witness, testified that a
bole in a tank aide wall would not cause the tank to rupture.
(Tr. 1094)

It is clear that Respondents did not acquire or possess the
requi•ite knowledge that the tanks were in danger of failing
because they leaked.

Appellant's claim that Respondents assumed

the risk because they observed leaks or irregularities or
unevenness in the tanks' surface must fail because Appellant did
not provide any evidence whatsoever at the trial that Respondents'
observations gave rise to a knowledge in the Respondents or an
appreciation by the Respondents that the tanks were otherwise
defective and did not have the necessary tensile strength to
hold liquid alum when filled.

Without a knowledge and apprecia-

tion of the possible dangers, Respondents cannot be found to
have voluntarily assumed any risks inherent in those same dangers.
Appellant also claimed at trial that in viewing all of the
"defects" in the tanks, Respondents must have known that the
tanks were negligently manufactured and therefore a dangerous
product.

However, no testimony was elicited and no evidence

was produced to show that the defects and irregularities had any
relationship to the defects which caused the rupture, or even
that any representative of the Conservancy District or Jacobsen
ever determined or concluded that the irregularities they
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observed meant that the tanks were negligently or defectiv.ly
manufactured and were therefore unsafe.
It is true that evidence concerning
of the tanks was so overwhelming,the trial court directed a
verdict with respect to that issue.

However, a careful reading

of the transcript reveals that the basis for the judge's decision
lay not with the minor and insignificant visual imperfections
in the tanks, but rather with the internal composition and
construction of the walls.

The evidence showed that the tank

walls were poorly constructed.

They did not even contain the

number of layers of fiberglass material which Mr. Bevan,as
president of Structo-Lite,testified would be necessary to insure
safety.

(Tr. 125, 221, 1257)

The real problems with the tanks

lay not in what could be observed by the naked eye,but within
the structure of the tanks themselves.

Again, no evidence was

presented that Respondents had any knowledge or conception of
the poor quality of the workmanship hidden within the tank walls
or the resulting possible dangers.

Clearly, Appellant failed

even to provide sufficient evidence to the court so as to make
the question one for a factual determination by the jury.
Respondents did not assume, either voluntarily or with knowledge,
any risk of injury.

The lower court therefore erred when it

permitted the question of Respondents' assumption of the risk
to go to the jury for determination.

That error should be

corrected by this Court.
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POINT V. RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLTED TO A FINDING, AS
A MATTER OF LAW, THAT THEY WERE NOT CONTRIBUTORILY
NEGLIGENT.

Following the close of Appellanes case, Respondents
also requested the judge to

rul~

as a matter of

Respondents were not contributorily negligent.

la~

that

Respondents

also requested the trial judge to so instruct the jury.

Both

requests were denied by the court, which denials were in error,
as a thorough review of the transcript and

evidence

reveals.

At trial Appellant claimed that Respondents were negligent
in the following particulars:
(a)

Respondents adopted and accepted inadequate tank

specifications and an improper building design.
(b)

The tanks were of such poor quality that Respondents

should have known this from observing the tanks.
(c)

Respondents knew that Appellant did not test the

tanks.
(d)

Respondents failed properly to inspect or test the

fiberglass tanks.
An examination of the evidence presented at trial again

shows that Appellant did not establish that its claims of
contributory negligence had any factual basis.
The claims of Appellant outlined in paragraph (a) are
identical to the claims Appellant made against Templeton, Linke
and Associates in its third-party complaint; namely, that the
specifications for the storage tanks were incorrect and inadequate
and that the building design was deficient.

At trial Appellant

claimed that Respondents were also negllgent because they accerte
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Linke and Associates.
The issue of Templeton, Linke and Associate's negligence
was presented to the jury, which found that Templeton, Linke
and Associates was not negligent.

It must be concluded therefraa

that the jury could not have determined that Respondents
were negligent in accepting the

tank

specifications and

building design, having already determined that they were neither
inadequate nor improper.

Appellant did not appeal the jury's

decision with respect to Templeton, Linke and Associates;
therefore, Respondents presume that the issues of the tank
specifications and improper building design are not before this
Court for review.
This leaves for purposes of this appeal the questions of
whether Respondents should have noticed the poor quality of
the tanks and who had responsibility for making inspections.
In both of these particulars Appellant failed to establish
the necessary elements of contributory negligence.
As with the doctrine of assumption of the risk, before
Respondents can be found to have been negligent in their
acceptance and use of the tanks, Respondents must have had
knowledge that it was dangerous to use the tanks for the purposes
for which they were fabricated.

Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum

Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 209, 282, p.2d 304 (1955).

In other words,

Respondents must have realized that filling the tanks with
liquid alum would cause them to fail.
~ailed i~ ~his Brief,

As has been heretofore de-

Appellant failed to present any evidence

~hatsoever
Respondents
that
the
tanks
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poorly constructed, Respondents should have known they would
fail, Respondents point out that while the evidence at trial

vas overwheLming in establishing the poor quality of workmanship
in the tanks, none of the evidence presented confirms Appellant's
theory that the defects in the tanks were anything but latent.
In considering how the tanks appeared to Respondents when they
were completed and installed at the Water Treatment Plant, it
must be kept in mind that the standard of care in judging negligence
is based on what the law requires of an ordinary, reasonable and
prudent person under the circumstance.

This test is based on

foresight and not what may appear obvious by hindsight.
Exceptional skill, foresight and caution are admirable traits,
but are not the required standard of conduct.

Larsen v. Johnson

21 Utah 2d 92, 440 P.2d 886 (1968); Hadley v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d
366, 345 P.2d 197 (1959); Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad CQ,,
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955).
Reviewing the testimony and evidence presented at trial, it
is clear that Appellant did not present any evidence to show that
Respondents' decision to install and use the tanks after observing
them was unreasonable.

The tank did not rupture because of out-

of-roundness, or because of an uneven or irregular outside surface,
or because the lid flanges at the tops of the tanks were damaged
in transit, or because some of the tanks had leaks in the
bottom portions which were completely repaired by Structo-Lite.
Moreover, no testimony or evidence was presented to establish
that any of these were more than minor irregularities, much less
Dr. Ken~e:
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able to determine that the tanks were of poor quality by a
careful visual examination after the one tank had ruptured.
(TR.266).

However, there is no evidence that Respondents,

all of whom were unskilled and unfamiliar in fiberqlass
fabrication, should be held to the same abilitiy of observation
exhibited by Dr. DeVries.
Dr.

DeVries-~uch

Moreover, the defects observed by

failure of the resin to properly adhere,

improper use of the

catalys~

excessive delamination and the

lack of uniformity in wall thickness--had not and could not
have been observed by Respondents prior to the rupturinq of
the tank.

(Tr. 266).

The defects in the tank which actually

caused it to burst--the lack of sufficient tensile strenqth,
the improper mix of glass and resin, the insufficient layers of
glass matting and woven roving--were not defects which could be
observed, even by an experienced eye, but were defects of a
latent nature, hidden beneath

the surface of the tanks.

Appellant

did not submit any evidence to establish that Respondents did
or should have observed such defects.
The last claim of Appellant is that Respondents knew Appellant
did not test the tanks for tensile strength;
were obligated to make the necessary tests.

therefore, Respondents
Contrary to Appellant's

assertion that Respondents knew Appellant had made no tests of
the tanks, there was no testimony or evidence adduced at
trial to support such a claim.

The trial transcript clearly

reveals that none of the witnesses even discussed the matter with
Structo-Lite.

(Tr.222, 564,664).

Turning to the final point

ca1sed by Appellant, that Respondents should have tested the
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to determine the tensile strengths of the tanks, Respondents
direct this Court's attention again to the infirmity which
inflicts all of Appellant's defenses:

namely, Appellant failed

to adduce any evidence at trial that Respondents had any duty
to test the tanks or their failure to test was in any way
unreasonable.
With respect to the hydrostatic testing performed by
Respondents, the evidence is uncontroverted that its sole purpose
was to determine whether the tanks had any leaks, not to test
for tensile strength.

(Tr. 484, 485)

As to the issue of whether Respondents should have tested
the tanks, Respondents note that the following uncontroverted
facts were adduced at trial:

1.

Jacobsen, as general contractor, had no authority to

conduct any tests or inspections at all on the materials or
workmanship at the Jordan Water Treatment Plant.

All testing,

inspection and approval of materials and work was ultimately the
responsibility of Templeton, Linke and Associates, the project
engineer.

(Exhibit 3-D-22, particularly paragraphs I.A.ll--

contractor to work with direction of engineer; I.A.35--engineer
to give all orders and directions and to determine acceptability
of materials; I.B.ll--all work and materials subject to inspectic:
•

I

by engineer; I.B.l2--fabricated materials to be approved by eng1neo•
2.

The right to select an independent testing or inspectior.

agency was permitted to the Conservancy District.

(Exhibit 3-o-::

paragraph I .A. 7.)
3.

In exercising its right under paragraph I.A.7. of the
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have American Testing Laboratory inspect the fabrication
and facilities of Structo-Lite.
4.

-.~~~•

(Tr.472).

Neither Jacobsen nor the Conservancy District had any

previous experience with fiberglass cons.truction. (l'r. 350, 465, 642).
5.

Structo-Lite held itself out to be fiberglass

engineers and knowledgeable in the construction and fabrication
of fiberglass products (Tr. 4, 13, 335, 336).
6.

Harvey Hutchinson of the Conservancy District made

substantial efforts to determine what could be done to insure
that the tanks would be satisfactory, including contacting a
former supervisor in California who told him that when performance
specifications were involved, testing was generally left to the
fiberglass fabricator.
7.

(Tr. 556).

Mr. Hutchinson had no knowledge on how to perform tests

on the completed tanks or how to cut samples for such tests.
(Tr. 556, 557).
8.

Mr. Hutchinson believed that Mr. Bevan as a fiberglass

engineer would perform the necessary tests in the normal process
of manufacturing the tanks.

(Tr. 564).

In addition to these undisputed facts, Mr. Peter G.
Russell,

an expert in fiberglass fabrication with Thiokol

Corporation, testified that it was common practice to deliver
performance specifications to a fiberglass fabricator, obtain
certification that the product would be built to specifications,
then accept and use the product without having investigated the
fabricator's capacity or plant (Tr. 1230, 1238).
'.i.

Mr. Arnold

Coon, a consulting engineer and head of a local engineering

~1:·:1'.,
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performance specifications to obtain a certification from
the manufacturer, such as that prepared by Structo-Lite, and
then rely on the expertise of the manufacturer for the end
result.

(Tr. 1189, 1194).

The only evidence presented by

Appellant at the trial revelant to the issue of testing the
tanks was the testimony of Mr. Glen Enke, retired Professor of
Engineering at Brigham Young University.

Mr. Enke testified that

because of his experience on the Utah State Board of

Engineer~

he

would investigate the background of anyone who claimed to be
an engineer (Tr. 1014, 1015, 1016), and that the project engineer
(Templeton, Linke and Associates) would have breached its duty
of care to the owner if it failed to determine what tests the
fabricator (Structo-Lite) intended to perform on the tanks or
to specify the test itself.

(Tr. 960, 962, 964).

At no time,

however, did Appellant proffer any evidence as to the standard
of care which should be applied to Jacobsen as the contractor
on the project to the Conservancy District, as owner, to see
that proper tests are performed, or to deal with individuals
who represented themselves as engineers, when they did not
have the benefit of 14 years experience on the Utah State Board
of Engineers as did Professor Enke.

The standard by which

Respondents' acts are to be measured is the conduct of the ordinar:
prudent person under similar circumstances and conditions, 57
Am. Jur. 2d,Negligence 337, not a standard of exceptional skill,
foresight and caution.

Hadlev \". Wood, Supra.

Appellant not only failed to carry its burden of proof
at trial
with respect to its alleged defense of contributory
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foundation on which a finding of contributory negligence
could be based.

This Court should hold that the lower court

erred in permitting the jury to determine an issue which
should have been resolved as a matter of law.
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POINT VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT

RBSPOilDBH'l'S 1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE AS

A11 ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR RELIEF THE WILLFUL AND RECKLESS
co•DUC'l' OP APPELLANT.
A~

cour~
~

the close of

Appellan~'s

case, Respondents asked the

for permission to amend their Complaint under Rule lS(b)

conform to the evidence adduced at the trial which showed

that Appellant was guilty of gross negligence or willful and
reckless conduct in the construction of the fiberglass tanks.
This Motion was denied by the trial judge, which Respondents
claim was error.
There is no doubt that under Rule lS(b), Utah Rules of Civil '
Procedure, if issues are tried with the express or implied consent

I

of the parties, then at the request of a party the pleadings
shall be amended to conform to the evidence.

General Insurance

Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra.

"Implied

consent" is found within the meaning of the rule whenever evidence
is admitted at the trial without objection from the opposing
party.

3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, U5.13[2], pp. 15-168 to

15-170 (2d Ed., 1979).
Respondents submit that the testimony and evidence adduced
at the trial as herein delineated was sufficient to raise an
issue that Appellant was grossly negligent and acted willfully
and recklessly in constructing the fiberglass storage tanks.
David Bevan, president of Structo-Lite, testified that in
laying up the fiberglass tanks, the workers would know if they
missed a spot.
purposeful.

(Tr. 193)

A miss, therefore, would have to be

Dr. DeVries' examination of the tanks, including

the
ruptured
tank,
clearly
numerous
spots
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tanks were missed.

(Tr. 266)

Even more serious, Mr. Bevan

testified that he never read the specifications prepared by
Templeton, Linke and Associates; he never performed any tests
on his tanks and he didn't even know what the term •tensile
strength" meant.

(Tr. 171, 190, 193)

This did not hinder him

from representing to Jacobsen that he was an expert in fiberglass
or from preparing and delivering a letter to Jacobsen in which
he warranted that the tanks would meet specifications he knew
he had neither read nor could understand (Tr. 179; Exh. 10, 11),
the specifications for construction of the tanks.

Such conduct

was termed by Professor Enke, Structo-Lite's own expert, •reckless."

(Tr. 1055, 1067)

The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk are not available to a defendant who is guilty of gross
negligence or reckless conduct.

Respondents should have been

granted their request to have the jury determine whether
Appellant was in fact guilty of gross negligence, recklessness
or willful misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully urge this Court to reject Appellant's
claim that Respondents are not entitled to recover, but on the
contrary are entitled to recover the full amount of their damages
as found by the jury, together with interest and costs.
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